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Abstract. This paper attempts to highlight a key source
of intangible value (i.e., intellectual capital) for family-based
businesses. By reviewing the merger and acquisition activity
of four Mexican cases, an analysis of the consideration of var-
ious intangible assets is conducted. Consequently, we intro-
duce the term intellectual capital in family businesses (ICFB)
and deﬁne it as a sum of a set of quantitative and qualita-
tive intangible assets aﬀecting overall business performance. A
metaphor for diagnosing the qualitative intangible assets for
family businesses is then suggested encompassing a ﬁrm’s soul
(human capital), brain (structural capital) and heart (rela-
tional capital).
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1. Introduction
Firms typically implement their growth strategies through
internal development, joint ventures, alliances or contract-
ing with external partners (Collis and Montgomery, 1997;
Dur´ an, 1997; Lorange and Roos, 1992). However, mergers
and acquisitions (M&As) have become one of the most sig-
niﬁcant vehicles for executing corporate growth strategies
and relocating resources in the global economy (Bleeke
and Ernst, 1993; Gupta and Roos, 2001; Normann, 1997;
Sudarsanam, 1996). By applying the resource-based view
of the ﬁrm (Barney; 1991), M&As can be seen as allow-
ing the ﬁrm’s portfolio of resources to be strategically
transformed for sustainable advantage. According to Duck
(2002), ﬁerce competition is stimulating greater industrial
consolidation, promoting M&As around the world. More-
over, several international trends have been driving M&A
deals including: low interest rates (Parsley, 1996), avail-
able credit, (Stone et al. 1996), globalisation (Bleeke
and Ernst, 1993; Mallete et al. 2003), higher technol-
ogy, privatisation as well as deregulation, and free trade
agreements.
The purpose of this paper is to provide academic
researchers, as well as business managers, with as
spotlight of some important issues regarding intangible
assets—speciﬁcally intellectual capital assets—and how
they aﬀect the overall value of the ﬁrm when attempting
M&As. To do so, we analyse four cases of Mexican family-
owned businesses that have been merged or acquired by
either national or international competitors. We then sug-
gest a framework for analysing key variables within a
construct called intellectual capital for family businesses
(ICFB).
2. Literature Review
M & A sa r ev i e w e da sa ne x t e r n a l investment alternative to
internal growth. Typically, when an M&A opportunity is
examined, an appraisal of the desirability of a prospective
purchase is conducted (Weston and Brighman, 1978). The
process begins with a pre-acquisition phase that involves
a careful self-examination of the company and the sec-
tors it participates in. It then continues with a screening
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process during which knock-out criteria are established.
Once the criteria are mapped on the candidate company,
a business valuation is undertaken. The process ends with
a careful negotiation and post-integration plan (Copeland
et al., 2000).
2.1. Relationship between mergers and
acquisition and family ﬁrms
It is widely recognised that family ﬁrms are the most
common type of business organisation worldwide (Bir-
ley and Godfrey, 1997; Carlock and Ward, 2001; Cromie
et al., 2001; Donckels and Frohlich, 1991; Dyer, 1989;
Heck and Trent, 1999; Ibrahim and Ellis, 1994; Kotkin,
1992; Reed, 1989; Ward and Sorenson, 1987). In fact, the
Spanish Instituto de la Empresa Familiar (IEF) estimates
that 60% of current worldwide enterprises are family-
owned, generating from 40 to 60% of the world’s GNP
(see http://www.iefamiliar.com).
Since the 1950s there has been a growing research
interest in family businesses. Studies regarding founders,
members of the Next Generation, non-family managers,
conﬂict and succession—among others—have highlighted
the fact that the family is an important, if not critical,
variable for the sustainability of family ﬁrms. However,
even though several advances in the ﬁeld have been devel-
oped, there is no current uniﬁed theoretical framework
or theory of the family ﬁrm that explains why family
ﬁrms exist and what determines their scale and scope
(Chrisman et al., 2003). Moreover, we have to take into
account problems arising about the degree of precision of
the term “family ﬁrm”, as well as on the deﬁnition of what
a “family” is. And, although the latter may seem confus-
ing and not helpful when determining the reason fam-
ily ﬁrms exist, a direct contribution clarifying this issue
is that of Christman et al. (2003), who concluded that
“Family ﬁrms exist because of the reciprocal economic
and non-economic value created through the combination
of family and business systems” (p. 7).
Family ﬁrms are complex entities in which busi-
ness and family issues interact in various ways (Cromie
et al., 2001). According to Gubitta and Gianecchini (2002)
family ﬁrms are companies in which two or more key
individuals are linked by kinship, close aﬃnity, or solid
alliances. These key individuals hold a suﬃciently large
share of ﬁnancial capital (full ownership) or board con-
trol (controlling ownership/governance) to enable them
to make decisions regarding strategic management and
overall business goals. In addition, Litz (1995) stated
that in classic family businesses, family members aim
to perpetuate or increase the degree of family involve-
ment, which refers to the degree a family member incurs
in behaviours/family interactions that produce certain
distinctive, synergistic vision and management of the fam-
ily ﬁrm. Unlike non-family companies—those where a
family is not involved in the management and/or owner-
ship of the ﬁrm, and where trans-generational pursuance
is unintended—the success of family ﬁrms depends on the
ability to manage three networks:
1. The familial network: which encompasses all the family
members pertaining to this institution (involved either
in the management, equity and/or in the “family inter-
actions”);
2. The organisational network: which includes all the peo-
ple who take part in the business (at the top, middle
and low levels, not including family members); and
3. The environmental network: this involves the external
stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers, banks and
other institutions.
Studies in family ﬁrms at the group level have added
to our knowledge one of the most pervasive problems
family companies suﬀer—family conﬂict. Conﬂict among
family members tends to be directly reﬂected in the ﬁrm,
especially if the degree of involvement in the company of
the family members is high. That is precisely why, try-
ing to ﬁnd a balance among these three networks is what
Carlock and Ward (2001) called “the family-enterprise
dilemma”. At the end, the familial network is so strong
that it inﬂuences the economic and non-economic develop-
ment of the ﬁrm as well as its sustainability over time. In
fact, sustainability over time is pretty diﬃcult when con-
ﬂict is present. Experience says that when this happens,
family ﬁrms generally close their doors or sell.
2.2. Family business challenges
Broadly speaking, there are three challenges that force
family business to consider closing or selling options:
1. The average life span of a family business is less than 25
years (Borkowski,2001) and generally, these companies
do not have a generational transition outline (i.e., suc-
cession plan) to ensure long-term survival. In Mexico,
only 7 out of 60 (11.67%) family businesses consulted
in our research had a documented generational tran-
sition outline. All seven of them were relatively large
companies (i.e., greater than $1,500,000 dollars a year
in income, and over 57 years old); companies which in
a way, have passed the threshold of the ﬁrst and sec-
ond succession crisis tend to be better suited for future
survival.
2. Most family businesses do not have a well-established
ﬁnancial infrastructure—an important amount ofSeptember 12, 2007 12:3 00174
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ready-to-use cash or ready-to-cash assets, internal liq-
uidity funds—which enables them to overcome severe
unexpected crises (e.g., a major industry downturn,
signiﬁcant drawings by owners, or large divestitures
made by family members).
3. Increased conﬂict and personal disagreements among
family members may often drive a family to sell the
business in order to maintain family unity (i.e., kinship,
aﬀection among members, culture and mutual roots,
family bonds/ties, enjoyable time spent together).
In Mexico, during the 1994 economic crisis, many
small, medium and large family businesses were closed,
merged or acquired. Indeed, even 5 or 6 years later, fam-
ily businesses were still being sold because they just could
not recover from the debt load. In this paper we examine
four cases of family businesses that completed a merger,
acquisition or both. These cases refer to medium and large
family businesses that had diﬃculty in recovering from
the 1994 ﬁnancial crisis. The main causes of failure were
somewhat diﬀerent in each case, but an external constant
remained the same: a weak ﬁnancial infrastructure in the
form of credit constraints and liquidity. The analysis of
each case also highlights the elusive consideration of intel-
lectual capital as it relates to the valuation of the business.
3. Case 1: Casa Roy—Los ´ Angeles
Casa Roy was a medium-sized chain of department stores
which became part of Grupo Los ´ Angeles when it merged
with Tienda Los ´ Angeles during the ﬁrst quarter of 1994.
After a year of working together, Grupo Los ´ Angeles com-
pleted the deal by acquiring the two remaining depart-
ment stores Casa Roy had, resulting in a 100% acquisition.
Casa Roy was a 100% family-owned business founded
in Monterrey, Nuevo Le´ on, by Rogelio Guerra more than
40 years before the merger. It was considered one of the
top ﬁve retailers in the state (Nuevo Le´ on) and had an
excellent reputation. People often referred to it as “La
Boutique M´ as Grande de Monterrey” (The Biggest Bou-
tique in Monterrey). Even though it was not the same size
as Sears, it was considered to be competing at that level
i.e., with the biggest global players. As years passed by
Don Rogelio never realised that his family was no longer
interested in the business. Of his ﬁve sons, not even one
wanted to take future charge of the family ﬁrm. After the
sons married, several family conﬂicts developed since the
in-laws argued that ﬁnancial distribution was, according
to them, not “fairly made”. In addition, no management
controls were in place. Family members withdrew money
as they pleased and merchandise was simply taken from
stores using the excuse “this is what others did before”.
Eventually, increased family tension and new competitors
in the market place resulted in decreased sales, quality
and service.
Grupo Los ´ Angeles (GLA) was also a young family
business, whose main founder was still in charge. Jes´ us
Trevi˜ no Gonz´ alez was a 40-year-old entrepreneur who
wanted to expand his business and increase its value. He
was sure that Casa Roy represented a big opportunity for
growth since during its best days it had been considered
an icon of the fashion industry in Monterrey. GLA kept all
Casa Roy employees during the post-acquisition phase. It
was important for GLA to continually develop employee
potential and even give some of them top management
positions. Twelve years after the merger and 11 years
after the completed acquisition, most of the employees
who stayed in the business were still working there. When
asked about her feelings towards the new integrated com-
pany, one employee said “there has not been any impact
here...wearestillthecompanywewere,althoughsome
proceduresarediﬀerent...asIseeit,whathappenedwas
that our former boss was too old and had to retire, while
our new boss is younger, full of energy and with bigger
expectations”.
4. Case 2: Canad´ a—Coppel
Calzado Canad´ a was a family-owned footwear company
founded by Salvador L´ opez Ch´ avez in 1940 in Guadala-
jara, Jalisco. For several decades it expanded throughout
Mexico while the domestic economy was protected from
external competition. Canad´ a’s shoes were considered
to be symbolic of the “Jalisciense” industry for several
decades. When North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) (1992–1993) forced the Mexican government to
open its frontiers to new foreign products and suppliers,
Calzado Canad´ a, was pushed to increase its quality, pro-
duction and service. To do so, the company invested a
large amount of money in expanding its capacity, improv-
ing its shoe designs and increasing customer service at the
shoe stores they owned all over Mexico. All these actions
were ﬁnanced by credit through Mexican banks amount-
ing to more than $5 million. After the 1994 ﬁnancial cri-
sis, interest rates sky-rocketed. Calzado Canad´ a suddenly
found itself heavily indebted. The peso devaluation, along
with a reduction in sales and accounts receivable made
one of the big 500 Mexican companies diminish its market
position gradually. A company which in its best years had
produced 65,000pairs of shoes daily, declared itself in debt
moratorium (insolvency): it just could not aﬀord its debts.
In 1996, revenues fell by two-thirds and by September
1997, banks (creditors) absorbed 80% of the family busi-
ness. The next generation owners of the company, Sandra
L´ opez Benavides and Tom´ as L´ opez Rocha lost control ofSeptember 12, 2007 12:3 00174
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the company. The liabilities totalled $45 million and the
company, as a result, had to be restructured. The causes
of the organisational collapse were both, external (i.e.,
the economic downturn) and internal (i.e., lack of man-
agement and ﬁnancial infrastructure, cash management,
cost of ﬁnancial instruments, debt).
In March 2002, Calzado Canad´ aw a ss o l dt oG r u p o
Coppel, a family-owned chain of department stores, which
had its origins in Sinaloa, M´ exico. Industry insiders pre-
dicted a resurgence of the old Calzado Canad´ a. It was
thought that Coppel was interested in the famous shoe-
business and wanted to get the most out of Canad´ a’s rep-
utable image and relational capital. After all, 64 years
in the Mexican shoe market was a good starting point.
When Coppel took over control of Calzado Canad´ a, it
decided to discontinue the production of shoes in the
plant at Jalisco, and turn the company into a distributor
of imported shoes. The last 1000 employees still work-
ing at the plant were dismissed. Now, Coppel-Canad´ a
produces only 4000 pairs of shoes per day (compared
to the 65,000 pairs it produced before being acquired).
The signiﬁcant drop in production can be attributable to
worldwide Brazilian shoe producer Azal´ eia who was orig-
inally involved (in a non-evident way) in Coppel’s acqui-
sition of Calzado Canad´ a. Before the acquisition, Coppel
had been a legal agent (sales representative) of Calzado
Azal´ eia in M´ exico. Azal´ eia wanted to penetrate into the
Mexican market, but did not want to start such an adven-
ture alone. When Calzado Canad´ a declared bankruptcy,
the Brazilian producer convinced its representative to buy
the company and start a joint venture together—Coppel
got 49% of the ownership and Azal´ eia kept 51%.
5. Case 3: Salinas Y Rocha—Elektra
Grupo Salinas y Rocha consisted of 86 furniture stores,
10 department stores, 21 warehouses and 3 distribution
centres. In the beginning, it was as a small furniture
store, founded by Benjam´ ın Salinas Westrup, in 1907,
in Monterrey, Mexico. During the ﬁrst to second gener-
ation transfer of family management, some discussions
regarding ownership took place. The resulting negotia-
tions caused two family branches to take diﬀerent courses
of action. One of these family branches started Grupo
Elektra in 1950. Grupo Elektra did not compete directly
with Salinas y Rocha since their focus was on the mass
middle-class population. On the other hand, Salinas y
Rocha targeted the well-to-do upper class segment. The
1990s were a diﬃcult time for Salinas y Rocha because
new competitors such as JC Penney came to the coun-
try. Furthermore, bank loans were called since the weak
ﬁnancial structure of the ﬁrm could not support the $100
million operating budget. Ultimately, Salinas y Rocha’s
poor performance resulted in the banks taking over 94.4%
of the company.
Grupo Elektra expanded over the years to become
a leading retailer in Mexico with signiﬁcant operations
domestically and in a number of other Latin Ameri-
can markets. On March 10, 1999, a syndicate of banks
holding a majority equity interest in Salinas y Rocha
declared Grupo Elektra the winner of an auction to
acquire the 94.4% outstanding equity interest. Grupo
Elektra’s leader, Ricardo Salinas Pliego was the great-
grandson of Benjam´ ın Salinas Westrup. He was very inter-
ested in the acquisition and saw it as a means of bringing
back the famed legacy that belonged to his family from
previous generations. He won the auction against the rich-
est businessman in Latin America, Carlos Slim, the owner
of Grupo Carso Comercial.
After the acquisition, Grupo Elektra initiated a cor-
porate reorganisation to take advantage of certain tax loss
carry-forwards reported by Salinas y Rocha. Within a few
months, it spun oﬀ three operating subsidiaries and within
two years sold the acquired department stores to Liver-
pool (a competitor) for $58 million.
6. Case 4: JC Penney—Carso
On November 30, 2003, Grupo Carso Comercial founded
by Carlos Slim, completed its purchase of 100% of the cor-
porate capital of JC Penney Mexico. The purchase con-
sisted of six department stores located in Monterrey, Le´ on,
Mexico City, Chihuahua, Canc´ un and M´ erida.
JC Penney was one of America’s largest department
stores, drugstores, catalogue and e-commerce retailers,
employing approximately 230,000 associates. It initiated
operations in Mexico during 1995 shortly after NAFTA
was negotiated among Canada, US. and Mexico. However,
the Mexican market was not as proﬁtable as JC Penney
expected.
By 2000, JC Penney started implementing a
turnaround strategy for its Department Stores and Cat-
alogue business units. The strategy consisted of applying
certain steps to continue improving the merchandise oﬀer-
ings, presenting a more integrated and powerful market-
ing message and lowering expenses. The ﬁnancial goal
was to generate segment operating proﬁt of 6–8% of
sales by 2005. Of course, the successful execution of the
turnaround strategy would be contingent on the success
of the company’s new merchandise oﬀerings. Nevertheless,
the strategy was not good enough. By 2003, JC Penney
closed the sale of its Mexico department store operation
as well as 25 US-located stores totalling more than 1.8
million sq. ft. of retail space.September 12, 2007 12:3 00174
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7. Valuation in Mergers and
Acquisition
One of the most important considerations of an M&A
transaction is reaching an agreement on the valuation of
each of the companies involved (Weston, 1964). Valuation
techniques and methods are fundamentally based on the
assumption that maximising shareholder value should be
the fundamental goal of all businesses (Copeland et al.,
2000; Garc´ ıa, 1998; Meigs et al., 1995; Shapiro, 1982;
Weston and Brighman, 1978). Measuring and managing
the value of companies typically involves a variety of pro-
cedures such as: analysing historical performance, fore-
casting future performance, estimating the cost of capital
and calculating and interpreting future results.
7.1. Intangible assets in mergers and
acquisition valuation
To say that the value of a business equals the present
value of its expected future cash ﬂows discounted at an
appropriate rate is simplistic. Market valuation should
also take into account the synergies and ﬁt that the busi-
ness may have with potential buyers, along with the intan-
gible assets obtained, transferred or acquired. In fact, the
qualitative factors in the M&A process may enable one
company to generate synergistic eﬀects obtaining a “two
plus two equals ﬁve” outcome. And, although there are
many sources for synergies to arise, one of them has been
suggested to be those intangible assets that make up the
intellectual capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998): human
capital, structural capital and relational capital including
family values and ties (Bontis, 1998; 2002). Values and
ties are important because they provide a basis for action,
they open information channels that reduce the amount
of time and investment required for making speciﬁc deci-
sions. “Ties provide the channels for information trans-
mission, but the overall conﬁguration of these ties [based
onfamilyv alues]...mayimpactthedevelopmentofintel-
lectual capital” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, p. 252);
“and as a result, the ﬁrm competitiveness and potential
sustainability over time”. In such situations the acquirer
may be willing to pay a substantial premium over previ-
ous levels of earnings, dividends, market or book values of
the acquired ﬁrm (Weston and Brighman, 1978; Weston,
1964).
As illustrated in our previous examples, families tend
to sell their businesses when there is little or no choice left.
Whenever the family sells, the main purpose of this action
is to obtain the best ﬁnancial deal possible, since they are
removing the family’s principal source of wealth. The busi-
ness also typically provides security as well as income and
employment for family members. Consequently, including
intangible assets (non-ﬁnancial measures) in the price is
essential.
The research literature investigating the role of non-
ﬁnancial value measures includes several empirical stud-
ies which have dealt with establishing the relevance and
value of intangible assets (Seethamraju, 2001). Lev and
Sougiannis (1996) developed a methodology to value
research and development (R&D) capital and amortise
it. Amir and Lev (1996) found that investors rely primar-
ily on non-ﬁnancial information when valuing ﬁrms (at
least in the wireless communications industry). Lev and
Zarowin (1999) made a proposal to comprehensively cap-
italise intangible investments and to introduce a system-
atic restatement of ﬁnancial reports. Moreover,Deng et al.
(1999) found that patent statistics are associated with the
market value of ﬁrms owning them. Bontis and Mill (2004)
determined that non-ﬁnancial measures such as web-based
metrics were often considered by analysts when valuing
dot-com companies. Finally, Ittner and Larcker (1998)
proved that customer satisfaction is a leading indicator
of ﬁnancial performance.
Research into intangibles has increased signiﬁcantly
over the last several years (Smith, 1999). Moreover, pro-
fessional associations such as the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB, 2001) and the International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) are working
on intangibles measurement. Under GAAP, most intan-
gible assets are not recognised in the ﬁnancial statements
of a ﬁrm, except when they are acquired and identiﬁ-
able (Seethamraju, 2001; Tuzun, 1992). This fact is in
opposition to ﬁndings showing that non-ﬁnancial infor-
mation about intangible assets plays a signiﬁcant role in
determining ﬁrm value. Accountants continue to face the
problem of how best to reﬂect intangible assets on the
ﬁnancial statements and whether or not to disclose them.
Generally speaking, intangible assets are included with
goodwill and amortised. However, there is considerable
discretion in determining the “useful” lives of intangible
assets amortised with goodwill (even though some changes
have been introduced lately both in North America and in
the UK). Consequently, the carrying value of intangibles
on the ﬁnancial statements may not be reﬂective of their
economic usefulness (Seethamraju, 2001).
Goodwill ...means the present v alue of future
earnings in excess of the normal return on net
identiﬁableassets...itisnotanidentiﬁableasset.
The existence of goodwill is implied by the abil-
ity of a business to earn an above average return;
however, the cause and precise dollar value of
goodwill are largely matters of personal opinion
(Meigs et al., 1995, p. 441).September 12, 2007 12:3 00174
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Investor’s appraisal of goodwill will vary depending
on the estimates of the future earning power of the
business. Nonetheless, very few businesses are able to
maintain above average earnings for more than a few
years. This makes it diﬃcult arriving at a fair value for the
goodwill of an ongoing business is a diﬃcult and subjec-
tive process (Meigs et al., 1995). Since the market value
of a ﬁrm is largely determined by the expected returns
to the ﬁrm’s tangible and intangible assets (Shane, 1995)
the question of how we determine the expected returns of
intangible assets—oﬀ-balance sheet items—such as brand
name, culture and intellectual capital remains a challenge
(Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Bontis et al., 1999; Choo
and Bontis, 2002).
Furthermore, we have to consider that many busi-
nesses have never purchased goodwill but have generated
it internally by developing good customer relations, supe-
rior management, or other factors that result in above-
average earnings. Favourable factors such as location,
product superiority and quality, service reputation and
personnel often generate positive goodwill. Nonetheless,
even though these factors may be important assets of a
successful business, they are usually not recorded in the
accounting records or even voluntarily disclosed (Bontis,
2003).
The central question for family ﬁrms considering
putting themselves up for sale is: how much is my com-
pany worth? For a small- or medium-size of company that
is not publicly traded on the stock market, this is a very
diﬃcult calculation. There are many emotional factors
attached to the book value of the company; moreover,
future expectations of the ﬁrm, the industry and the mar-
ket must be considered, too. On the other had, these ﬁrms
are rarely aware of the existence of their own intellectual
capital.
In the case of Casa Roy, most of the employees who
were working before the merger stayed on after it. More-
over, the business continued being a family-owned com-
pany. According to the Los ´ Angeles former owner,when he
bought the company, it was not in its best moment, even
though he paid 1.5 times more than the market value.
His stated reason was “...because it had a great geo-
graphic location, a long lasting image, loyal customers and
really good workers; it was a matter of bringing the best
players into my business” (Interview with Jes´ us Trevi˜ no
Gonz´ alez, owner).
In the case of Calzado Canad´ a, the selling price was
not publicly announced. Coppel dismissed almost all of
its workers who had at some point contributed to Calzado
Canad´ a’s past success. Of course, one could ﬁnd strategic
reasons for the move (e.g., rationalisation of costs), since
the company is not a producer any more, but basically
a shoe reseller. We can infer that they did not consider
intangibles like intellectual or human capital when buy-
ing the business, since they would have kept at least some
of the employees working with them. Dismissing all of
them implied that there was no future economic bene-
ﬁt from that particular intellectual capital asset. And,
although it is true that intellectual capital has value
within a particular context—in this case the family busi-
ness context—it is also true that the knowledge these
employees possessed may have been exploited in a use-
ful way in the new context.
What about the value in a brand? Coppel was not as
well known as Canad´ a in the shoe industry, so to leverage
Canad´ a’s customer base and good image it kept Canad´ a’s
brand. Was this valued by the owners of Calzado Canad´ a
when they sold the business? Certainly, since the ﬁnan-
cial statements included a valuation of brands and trade-
marks Canad´ a legally owned. However, how well these
brands were valued under accounting conventions is not
clear.
When Salinas y Rocha was acquired by Elektra, a
selling price was chosen through an auction methodol-
ogy. Only 50% of the employees who worked there con-
tinued serving customers in the furniture stores after the
acquisition (and before being sold to Liverpool). Although
turnover was expected in this industry, there was a con-
certed eﬀort to maintain some of the human capital of the
previous organisation given the former familial ties.
JC Penney M´ exico (now called Dorian’s) is still
employing the same people it had before being acquired,
except for the top management team. The ﬁnal agree-
ment between JC Penney Corporation Inc. and its sub-
sidiary JC Penney M´ exico, excludes the commercial name
and other related intellectual property (legally registered
brand and trademarks) regarding JC Penney. Grupo San-
borns only had the right to use the commercial name and
the related intellectual property for a speciﬁc transition
period. Thus, in this case, there may have been a ﬁnancial
consideration given to the intangibles of this deal.
As reviewed in the cases above, although other
intangibles besides brands and trademarks (e.g., human
capital) may have been considered during the negotia-
tions, there was no evidence of this within the consoli-
dated ﬁnancial statements. Moreover, according to IAS
38 (International Accounting Standards) an intangible
asset should only be recognised at cost in the ﬁnan-
cial statements—and therefore valued for selling price
purposes—if and only if:
(a) The asset meets the deﬁnition of an intangible asset.
Particularly, there should be an identiﬁable asset
that is controlled and clearly distinguishable from anSeptember 12, 2007 12:3 00174
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enterprise’s goodwill (such as brands and trademark
registrations).
(b) It is probable that the future economic beneﬁts are
attributable to the asset will ﬂow to the enterprise;
and
(c) The cost of the asset can be measured reliably.
Since intellectual capital (particularly human capi-
tal) cannot be measured reliably, those intangible assets
are not considered as “intangibles” for ﬁnancial purposes.
According to IAS, goodwill is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the cost of the purchase and the fair value of
the net assets. Consequently, the surplus price a buyer
may pay when acquiring a business (e.g., Grupo Los
´ Angeles) may not only be related to intangibles such as
intellectual capital, but also to a whole series of other
non-tangible factors that altogether aﬀect the company’s
output.
8. Role of Intellectual Capital in Family
Business
The ﬁeld of intellectual capital has grown signiﬁcantly
in the last decade (Serenko and Bontis, 2004). Although
primarily focused on the ﬁrm level of analysis, it has
recently been conceptualised for teams (Chauhan and
Bontis, 2004) and nations (Bontis, 2004). A ﬁrm’s intellec-
tual capital consists of the unique collection of intangible
resources, and their transformations and interrelation-
ships (Bontis, 1999; 2001). Indeed, synergies involving
core intellectual capital (business knowledge and knowing
capabilities that foster a sustainable competitive advan-
tage) oﬀer unique opportunities to develop increased per-
formance and sustainable competitive advantage (Bontis
et al., 2000; Gupta and Roos, 2001; O’Regan et al., 2001;
O’Donnell et al., 2006).
Viewed statically and on their own, intangible
resources do not create value. Instead, the value of
any resource comes from its interactions with other
resources (Seliem et al., 2004). “Following Schumpeter
(1934), Moran and Ghoshal (1996) have argued that all
new resources, including knowledge [and therefore intel-
lectual capital], are created through two generic pro-
cesses: namely, combination and exchange” (Nahapiet
and Ghoshal, 1998, pp. 247–248). This approach suggests
then that intellectual capital is a set of interrelationships
intertwined in the organisational system of the enterprise
(Bontis and Fitz-enz, 2002). It represents a capability of
a social collectivity, and in turn, it is diﬃcult to value and
consists of causal ambiguity (Chi, 1994; Gupta and Roos,
2001; Lippman and Rumelt, 1982).
What distinguishes family businesses from pub-
licly traded companies is indeed the “family”. Adding
family values, loyalty, pride, know-how, social capital,
cohesiveness, reputation, meaning, culture and all the
other strengths of family business ownership and man-
agement seems to provide sustenance not available to
other enterprises (Aronoﬀ, 2001). For instance, a recent
study (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) depicts how even among
the S&P500, ﬁrms that are under the inﬂuence of found-
ing families economically outperform those that are not.
Some other studies have reached similar conclusions on
diﬀerences between family and non-family ﬁrms in terms
of policies and ethics (Adams et al., 1996), succession
and post-succession performance (G´ omez-Mej´ ıa et al.,
2001), corporate governance (Randoy and Goel, 2003)
and performance characteristics such as size, growth,
ﬁnancial structure, productivity and proﬁtability (Gallo,
1995; McConaughy and Phillips, 1999). In addition, a
family business has something most large non-family
publicly-traded companies do not have: unity of pur-
pose. Common family bonds and historical legacies—
traditions—among family members allow them to do
things that stockholders—from diﬀerent backgrounds—in
public companies may not want to do, or may not have
the ownership or control to implement at all—power is
diluted among many shareholders (Trevinyo-Rodr´ ıguez,
2007).
Indeed, when referrring to family ﬁrms, values and
family ties (unity and trust) act as the backbone of the
ﬁrm, as intangible resources transmitted and carried tra-
ditionally from generation through generation (Trevinyo-
Rodr´ ıguez and T` apies 2006). In fact, a current study
(Trevinyo-Rodr´ ıguez, forthcoming) considering how fam-
ily values and business strategy impacted the M&A post-
integration stage in Spanish ﬁrms, found out that when
referring to M&A deals between family-owned ﬁrms, val-
ues are a crucial element while addressing integration
complexities and performance.
In addition, much of the knowledge in the company is
tacitly embedded in cumulative experiences that reside in
the memory of workers and/or family members, being not
generally codiﬁed, but kept in the people’s non-formalised
but routinised actions and interactions with each other
(Trevinyo-Rodr´ ıguez and T` apies, 2006). The latter means
that when dealing with family ﬁrms, their capabilities,
competencies and innate resources are often comprised of
a relevant tacit component rolled in skilled people, organ-
isational culture and traditions, acting as a source of com-
petitive advantage.
All these forms of qualitative intangible assets plus
the quantitative intangibles that aﬀect the overall busi-
ness performance is what we refer to as the intellectual
capital of family businesses (ICFB). Thus, based on the
cases presented, those qualitative intangibles must includeSeptember 12, 2007 12:3 00174
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people, processes, culture, traditions, brands, patents,
trademarks, and soon.
Let us assume that the qualitative intangible assets
that do not show up on the ﬁnancial statements of the
ﬁrm consist of:
1. The soul of the ﬁrm—described as the founder and/or
family’s vision, values, energy, social networks, cohe-
siveness and commitment transmitted to the employ-
ees working there (even after the acquisition). This is
often referred to as the human capital (HC) of the ﬁrm.
2. The brain of the ﬁrm—described as the processes, pro-
cedures and policies of the organisation. This is often
referred to as the structural capital (SC) of the ﬁrm.
3. The heart of the ﬁrm—described as the central net-
work of the enterprise through which all relationships
among various parts of the ﬁrm are preserved (i.e., it
pumps blood to the system and preserves life). This is
often referred to as the relational capital (RC) of the
ﬁrm.
From these assumptions, we may say that the set
of qualitative intangibles that compose an integral part of
the ICFB is based on the interaction of three sets of intan-
gibles: soul (human capital), brain (structural capital) and
heart (relational capital). Considering that intellectual
capital cannot be changed immediately after the M&A, we
may say it resembles the immortality of a “soul”. Besides,
taking into account that this vital core works together
with the “heart” under certain action patterns (brain), we
may infer that all of these are going to aﬀect the overall
health of the system, which simulates the ﬁnancial per-
formance of the ﬁrm.
8.1. Soul, Brain and Heart
According to Hughes (2004, p. 17), “the human capital
of a family consists of the individuals who make up the
family. The intellectual capital of a family is comprised of
the knowledge gained through the life experiences of each
family member, or what the family member knows regard-
ing the business and relationships achieved”. We must add
to this deﬁnition the fact that family intellectual capital is
not only the family members’ knowledge gained through
life experiences, but also their shared values expressed as
traditions (family culture) and business acumen transmit-
ted to the employees while working there (and staying
after the acquisition). All these items together form a
unique entity. This is what the family tries to pass on
from generation to generation in an eﬀort to create new
organisational learning processes (Bontis et al., 2002).
The failure to acknowledge and measure the intellec-
tual capital of a family is the principal cause for the failure
of a family to preserve its wealth (Hughes, 2004). If fam-
ilies do not value what they have and what they know
about the business, they are not appreciating what keeps
their family business alive. Measuring a family’s intellec-
tual capital is complex and diﬃcult, since no objective test
can exactly calculate what every individual knows or can
learn. Moreover, there is no way of measuring the strength
of the family ties (bond) and how it fosters certain syn-
ergies among family members while in the family ﬁrm.
The analogy presented above is a framework that we rec-
ommend families use in order to articulate the constructs
embedded within the intellectual capital.
In the Casa Roy—Los ´ Angeles case, the soul (HC)
of the Guerra family was highly considered in its valua-
tion. One explanation may be that the Los ´ Angeles owner
knew the Guerra family had extensive experience in the
fashion industry for almost 50 years. Also, the values and
principles of the Guerra family resembled the Los ´ Angeles
family. This particular M&A was an opportunity to har-
vest the best of each family’s soul (HC), brain (SC) and
heart (RC).
In the Calzado Canad´ a—Coppel case, the soul (HC)
of the enterprise was not considered when selling the busi-
ness. Not even the family culture and its special know-
how transmitted to the employees was taken into account,
since all of them were dismissed. Here is a typical example
of how one family exterminated another’s family intellec-
tual capital and imposed its own. There was no eﬀort to
harvest the brain (SC) or heart (RC) of the ﬁrm. Instead
there was just complete annihilation of the qualitative
intangible value of the organisation.
In the Salinas y Rocha—Elektra case, neither organ-
isation considered the synergistic opportunity in each
other’s soul (HC) since they just imposed their own. Usu-
ally, this happens when large ﬁrms acquire other large
ﬁrms due to the enormous diﬃculties of integration. The
challenge of coordinating two disparate familial cultures
is often extremely diﬃcult. Organisational culture is a
pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has
invented, discovered or developed in learning to cope with
its problems of external adaptation and internal integra-
tion (Schein, 1983). The business itself creates a series of
relationships and assumptions among its members which
are a basis for behaviour patterns. In this case, beyond
wanting to bring the original family unit back home, the
acquiring organisation discounted the value of the ﬁrm’s
brain (SC) and heart (RC).
Finally, in the JC Penney—Carso case, the soul (HC)
of the organisationremained after the acquisition. In addi-
tion, the value of the brand was justiﬁably recognised
because there was a limitation stipulated in the deal in
terms of how long and under what circumstances theSeptember 12, 2007 12:3 00174
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Table 1. Case review.
Quantitative Combined
Qualitative intangible assets intangible assets market cap
Soul Brain Heart Brand, Growth
Human capital Structural capital Relational capital trademarks, patents 1994–2003
Case 1: Casa Roy—Los ´ Angeles     +47%
Case 2: Canad´ a—Coppel ×× ×  +27%
Case 3: Salinas y Rocha—Elektra  ××  +31%
Case 4: JCPenney—Carso  ×× +12%
× not considered; implicitly considered; directly considered.
trademarks could be used. Table 1 summarises the four
case studies and highlights whether or not the intangible
assets were considered in the negotiations.
Results from Table 1 have been derived based on
archival data, on interviews with people pertaining to the
selected ﬁrms regarding the use of qualitative and quanti-
tative intangible assets during the M&A processes expe-
rienced, and on ﬁnancial statements we obtained from
these ﬁrms (after the M&A deals). In order to estimate
the market value or market capitalisation of the enter-
prises, we used multiple based valuations, since at this
time most of the analysed companies were not traded
in at the market. The multiple of discretionary earnings
method was used in order to assess the total value of
the companies along the studied period of time (1994–
2003), being that value averaged and compared to the ini-
tial estimate of the market value (1994). The percentage
shown below in the combined market cap (growth) column
shows the estimated value increase the companies experi-
enced after the M&A deal (1993–2003). Clearly, there is a
distinction among the cases as to whether qualitative or
quantitative constructs were included in the overall M&A
analysis.
Although we cannot determine an empirical relation-
ship based on the four cases, we propose that M&A deals
in which both qualitative and quantitative constructs are
considered, there is a positive impact associated with long-
term return on investment, which in turn, is positively
associated with market capitalisation growth (dependent
on the sector and industry the ﬁrm is in).
9. Conclusion
After a review of four family business cases of M&As in
Mexico, we introduced a new term called intellectual cap-
ital in family businesses (ICFB) which recognises both
quantitative and qualitative intangible assets. Although
quantitative intangible assets (e.g., brands) can be read-
ily found and valued in ﬁnancial statements, qualitative
intangible assets (e.g., expertise) are more ephemeral. In
order to help practitioners, we introduce an analogy that
extends the traditional labels of intellectual capital to
make more sense in the family business context.
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